The developers of Triton, a recently discovered piece of malware designed to target industrial control systems (ICS), reverse engineered a legitimate file in an effort to understand how the targeted devices work. Triton, also known as Trisis and HatMan, was discovered in August 2017 after a threat group linked by some to Iran used it against a critical infrastructure organization in the Middle East. The malware targets Schneider Electric's Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers, which use the proprietary TriStation network protocol.
The malware leveraged a zero-day vulnerability affecting older versions of the product. FireEye's Advanced Practices Team has conducted a detailed analysis of the threat, which it describes as a malware framework, in an effort to determine when and how it was created. The TriStation protocol is designed for communications between PCs (e.g. engineering workstations) and Triconex controllers.
With no public documentation available, the protocol is not easy to understand, but it has been implemented by Schneider through the TriStation 1131 software suite. It's unclear how the attackers obtained the hardware and software they used to test the malware. They may have purchased it or borrowed it from a government-owned utility.
The software could have also been stolen from ICS companies or other organizations that use Triconex controllers. FireEye believes, however, that the malware developers did not build the TriStation communications component from the ground up. The company's analysis suggests that the hackers copied code from legitimate libraries.
Specifically, researchers discovered significant similarities between the code found in the malware and code in a legitimate TriStation software file named "tr1com40.dll." While reverse engineering the legitimate DLL file may have helped them understand how TriStation works, the code in the malware suggests it did not answer all their questions. This may have led to the problems experienced by the threat group during its attack on the critical infrastructure organization.
Triton was discovered after it accidentally caused SIS controllers to initiate a safe shutdown. Experts believe the attackers had been conducting tests, trying to determine how they could cause physical damage. Learn More at SecurityWeek's 2018 ICS Cyber Security Conference
"Seeing Triconex systems targeted with malicious intent was new to the world six months ago. Moving forward it would be reasonable to anticipate additional frameworks, such as TRITON, designed for usage against other SIS controllers and associated technologies," FireEye said in its report. "If Triconex was within scope, we may see similar attacker methodologies affecting the dominant industrial safety technologies." Industrial cybersecurity firm Dragos reported recently that the threat group behind the Triton attack, which it tracks as Xenotime, is still active, targeting organizations worldwide and safety systems other than Schneider's Triconex.
At least 115,000 websites powered by version 7 of the Drupal content management system are still vulnerable to Drupalgeddon2 attacks, despite patches being available since late March. The flaw dubbed Drupalgeddon2 is officially tracked as CVE-2018-7600. It allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code and take complete control of a website running Drupal 6, 7 or 8.
The issue has been patched since the release of versions 7.58, 8.5.1, 8.3.9 and 8.4.6, with fixes also available for Drupal 6, which is no longer supported since February 2016. Drupalgeddon2 has been exploited by malicious actors for both server-side and client-side attacks that deliver cryptocurrency miners, backdoors, RATs and tech support scams. Despite the high risk of attacks, many administrators of Drupal websites still haven't applied the patches.
Researcher Troy Mursch has conducted an analysis of Drupal 7 websites - Drupal 7 is the most widely used version and it currently powers more than 830,000 sites - and found that many are still vulnerable. Mursch identified nearly 500,000 Drupal 7 websites through the PublicWWW source code search engine and found that 115,070 had been running outdated and vulnerable versions of the CMS. The analysis showed that roughly 134,000 sites had not been vulnerable, while for 225,000 the version they had been using could not be determined.
"Numerous vulnerable sites found in the Alexa Top 1 Million included websites of major educational institutions in the United States and government organizations around the world. Other notable unpatched sites found were of a large television network, a multinational mass media and entertainment conglomerate, and two well-known computer hardware manufacturers," Mursch wrote on his Bad Packets Report blog. The list of vulnerable websites has not been made public, but the researcher did send it to US-CERT and the Drupal Security Team.
While conducting the analysis, Mursch discovered a significant cryptojacking campaign that leverages the Coinhive service. Malicious actors managed to compromise at least 258 Drupal sites and abused them to mine for cryptocurrency. The list of victims included the Attorney General's Office in Colorado, a police department in Belgium, and Fiat-owned automotive parts manufacturer Magneti Marelli.
An India-based research organization hit by this campaign had updated Drupal, but it failed to remove the malicious code. As the Drupal Security Team warned, updating the CMS does not remove malicious code from already compromised websites. This is the second cryptojacking campaign discovered by Mursch since the disclosure of Drupalgeddon2.
In early May, he reported discovering more than 300 websites hacked in a similar operation, including sites belonging to universities and governments.
During the analysis of Drupalgeddon2, the Drupal Security Team and developer Jasper Mattsson, who also reported the original vulnerability, identified another flaw.
This second vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2018-7602 and dubbed by some Drupalgeddon3, has also been exploited in the wild.
Despite their infrastructure being disrupted, the hackers behind the VPNFilter botnet continue targeting routers located in Ukraine, which is believed to be the campaign's primary target. When Cisco Talos brought the existence of VPNFilter to light last month, the botnet had ensnared at least 500,000 routers and network-attached storage (NAS) devices across 54 countries. The malware can intercept data passing through the compromised device, it can monitor the network for communications over the Modbus SCADA protocol, and also has destructive capabilities that can be leveraged to make an infected device unusable.
During the first stage of the infection process, once it completed initialization, the malware attempted to obtain an IP address from images hosted on the Photobucket service. If that failed, it would try to acquire the IP from an image hosted on a backup domain, toknowall.com. That IP pointed to a server hosting the stage 2 payload.
Photobucket has closed the accounts used in the attack and the FBI has managed to take control of the toknowall.com domain, thus disrupting the operation. However, VPNFilter is designed to open a listener and wait for a specific trigger packet if the backup domain fails as well. This allows the attacker to still provide the IP for the stage 2 component.
While it's unclear exactly what else the FBI and cybersecurity firms did to disrupt the botnet, researchers at Jask and GreyNoise Intelligence noticed that VPNFilter has continued to target routers even after Talos published its report and the toknowall.com domain was seized. Experts have observed some IPs scanning port 2000 for vulnerable MikroTik routers located exclusively in Ukraine. The source IPs have been traced to countries such as Russia, Brazil, the United States, and Switzerland.
"Activity like this raises some interesting questions about indications of ongoing Ukraine targeted campaigns, a likely subject for future research," Jask wrote in a blog post. The VPNFilter attack was allegedly launched by Russia - specifically the group known as Sofacy, APT28, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, and Sednit - and the main target is believed to be Ukraine. Some links have also been found between the VPNFilter malware and BlackEnergy, which has been used by a different Russia-linked threat actor known as Sandworm.
The FBI has viewed Sofacy and Sandworm as the same group when it attributed VPNFilter to Russia. The VPNFilter malware has been observed targeting devices from Linksys, MikroTik, Netgear, TP-Link and QNAP. All of these vendors have published advisories to warn their customers about the threat.
The FBI has advised users to reboot their routers to temporarily disrupt the malware.
While rebooting a router is typically enough to remove a piece of malware, VPNFilter has a clever persistence mechanism that helps its stage 1 component survive a reboot of the device.